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1. Introduction 
Bushman and Piotroski (2006) examine cross-country institutional determinants of 
accounting conservatism. In particular, the authors examine variation in accounting conservatism as 
a function of the legal/judicial system, securities laws, financial architecture, political economy, and 
tax regime. Accounting conservatism, defined by the authors to be the asymmetric recognition of 
economic gains and losses into earnings, is a widely documented feature of accounting reports. 
Knowledge of the nature and determinants of accounting conservatism is fundamental to 
understanding how and why financial reports are used in contracting, valuation, legal, and other 
institutional settings. By exploring these issues in a cross-country setting, Bushman and Piotroski 
(2006) advance this literature and our understanding of why and how accounting conservatism fits 
into the overall financial reporting system. 
 In this discussion, we focus on three issues. First, hypotheses about why asymmetric 
recognition of accounting gains and losses exists and varies across firms or countries do not appear 
to be developed from a common and accepted economic framework. Toward this end, in Section 3, 
we offer and briefly describe one such framework that we believe is useful in generating economic 
predictions about the demand for conservative accounting reports. We define conservatism as: More 
timely recognition of losses than gains resulting from asymmetric costs and benefits of reporting 
                                                 
1 We thank Sudipta Basu, Robert Bushman, John Core, Robert Holthausen, Christian Leuz, Ross Watts, and participants 
at the 2004 Journal of Accounting & Economics Conference for comments and suggestions.  
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verifiable information by managers and/or firms with incentives to distort firm performance. A key 
takeaway from this framework is that arguments supporting the efficiency of conservative 
accounting need not emphasize the merits of timely recognition of losses, as these are obvious. 
Instead, arguments must articulate the merits of less timely recognition of gains. In other words, 
under an assumption that timely recognition of information is a desirable property of accounting 
reports, what are the costs and benefits that make accounting reports more efficient when 
recognition of economic gains is delayed relative to the recognition of economic losses?  
Second, we discuss Bushman and Piotroski’s interpretation for “Basu-type” regressions of 
earnings on stock returns. We express concern, or at least caution, about interpreting the speeds of 
“good news recognition” and “incremental bad news recognition” as separate signals about 
accounting conservatism. We illustrate how their interpretation of good and bad news recognition is 
equivalent to a conservatism measure based on the relative sensitivities of bad news and news in 
general. Further, we discuss conditions under which the relative sensitivity is a problematic measure 
of conservative accounting systems that facilitate efficient contracting. The intuition for this 
inference problem stems from the fact that the relative sensitivity interpretation will tend to 
categorize countries with less timely recognition of news in earnings as being more conservative.  
Finally, we discuss Bushman and Piotroski’s use of legal, political and financial institutions 
as proxies for contracting settings that demand conservative accounting. Little empirical evidence 
exists on whether contracts are actually used to a greater or lesser extent in the presence of specific 
legal, political and financial institutions. Further, there is limited empirical evidence on whether 
specific contracting settings demand more or less conservative accounting. Although Bushman and 
Piotroski’s results support predicted relations between institutions and conservatism overall, we 
note that their evidence is not conclusive on the validity of these two implicitly assumed links. We 
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suggest avenues for future research that directly investigate the links between institutions and 
contracts, and between contracts and conservatism.  
 
2.   Summary of existing explanations for conservatism  
Watts (2003a, p. 211) notes that, “Contracting explains three attributes of accounting 
measures: timeliness, verifiability, and asymmetric verifiability.” Watts (2003a, p. 207) also states, 
“Conservatism is defined as the differential verifiability required for recognition of profits versus 
losses. Its extreme form is the traditional conservatism adage: ‘anticipate no profit, but anticipate all 
losses.’”  
 There has been considerable debate over the merits and determinants of conservatism. Ball 
(2001) and Watts (2003a, 2003b) summarize arguments and evidence that support conservatism as 
part of an efficient contracting technology. Both authors begin by assuming there exist two types of 
accounting information about net asset value and future cash flows: i) easy-to-verify information 
and, ii) difficult-to-verify information. Easy-to-verify information might consist of shocks to 
operating cash flow, accounts receivable, inventory, accounts payable, etc. In general, easy-to-
verify information is incorporated into financial statements in a timely manner and there is little 
debate that the asymmetric recognition of this information is necessary or desirable.  
Discussions about conservatism mostly revolve around the accounting treatment of difficult-
to-verify information, which might consist of shocks to the value of R&D activities, treatment of 
goodwill, restructuring costs related to plant closings, benefits from a brand name, etc. Ball (2001) 
and Watts (2003a) consider several characteristics of difficult-to-verify information that drive the 
efficient level of asymmetric gain and loss recognition, including: 1) greater costs of incorporating 
difficult-to-verify information into financial statements vis-à-vis easy-to-verify information; 2) 
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lower reliability of difficult-to-verify information vis-à-vis easy-to-verify information; 3) 
asymmetric usefulness of profits and losses to some users of financial statements (e.g., 
bondholders); and 4) managerial incentives to bias financial reports upwards in an attempt to extract 
excess compensation.  
 It is not difficult to see why timely incorporation of information, if it can be collected and 
verified cost effectively, would improve the usefulness of financial reports to investors and other 
contracting parties. Further, it is not difficult to see how difficult-to-verify information might, in 
some cases, be too unreliable or costly to incorporate into financial statements.   Therefore, the crux 
of the debate about the merits of conservatism should revolve around the question of why, 
conditional on the decision to incorporate some difficult-to-verify information into accounting 
statements, economic gains are recognized in a less timely manner than economic losses. We 
perceive that much of the existing literature on conservatism is focused exclusively on why 
information about losses should be incorporated in financial statements in a timely manner, with 
little if any, research on why information about gains should be excluded from timely recognition in 
financial statements.  
Based on our reading of the existing literature, we identify three key characteristics of 
conservative accounting:2 1) Compared to accounting reports without conservatism, conservative 
accounting reports induce a downward bias in reported net assets; 2) Conservative accounting 
reports contain less timely information about gains than about losses; and 3) Conservative 
accounting rules impose greater costs on managers who wish to manipulate net assets upward. 
Below we articulate what we believe is a more transparent framework for thinking about 
                                                 
2 See Watts (2003b) for an excellent discussion of these three characteristics as well as other empirical findings on 
conservatism. 
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conservative financial reports, while preserving the spirit of the arguments summarized by Ball 
(2001), Watts (2003a), and others. 
 
3. An economic framework for conservative accounting 
3.1   Conservatism as asymmetric costs and benefits of reporting verifiable information 
 
The purpose of this section is twofold.  Firstly, we suggest an interpretation of conservatism 
that comports well with the extant theory on asymmetric costs and benefits of reporting verifiable 
information when managers or firms have incentives to bias or distort results of operations in their 
profit reports.  Specifically, we interpret a conservative financial reporting system as one that results 
from two economic objectives: 1) to make it costly for a manager to deviate from the firm's true, 
economic earnings in accounting reports, and 2) to maximize the net benefits of financial reports, in 
which reporting verifiable information is costly and some users of financial statements have an 
asymmetric demand for information about losses and gains.  Secondly, we point out that 
asymmetric conventions are inefficient from an information perspective.  Thus, for an asymmetric 
convention to be efficient overall, it must more than compensate for the cost of this informational 
inefficiency. Further, we note that some contracting-based conservatism hypotheses, such as the 
role of conservatism in monitoring managerial compensation, rely heavily on the informational 
efficiency of conservative accounting, and as such appeared flawed.   
 We illustrate our interpretation of conservatism through a simple example. We consider a 
one-period model, adapted from Fisher and Verrecchia (2000), in which the manager observes 
(true) economic earnings and then reports results of operations with perhaps an element of bias 
intended to obfuscate true earnings. To keep the example as transparent as possible, we assume that 
economic earnings are comprised of an easily verifiable profit component (e.g., current period cash 
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flow) plus a more difficult-to-verify anticipated profit component (e.g., a restructuring charge or 
appreciation in the value of an intangible asset). We assume that the easily verifiable component is 
positive $50 million (henceforth, m) in all states of the world. We restrict the difficult-to-verify 
anticipated component to be negative $30 m in a bad year, $0 in a typical year, and positive $30 m 
in a good year. Thus, economic earnings' outcomes are a profit of $20 m in a bad year, a profit of 
$50 m in a typical year, and a profit of $80 m in a good year. The ex ante, or unconditional, 
probability of each outcome is as follows: a profit of $20 m occurs 25% of the time; a profit of $50 
m occurs 50% of the time; and a profit of $80 m occurs 25% of the time. As an aside, the actual 
profit figures, and the likelihood of those figures, or, for that matter, a profit versus a loss, are not 
important to this illustration; we choose these amounts as a matter of convenience. 
 Now consider the nature of an equilibrium to a circumstance in which the manager reports 
profits to the market. As in Fisher and Verrecchia (2000), we assume that on average the manager 
has an incentive to bias reports upward so as to favorably enhance firm share price, and that the 
market has rational expectations about the manager's actions.  Further, we assume that standard 
setters, auditors, regulators, etc., impose personal costs on managers that bias reports. Hence, the 
manager trades off benefits of bias as a device to favorably enhance firm share price in the presence 
of a market that anticipates and discounts the bias to some degree, against the personal cost to the 
manager of biasing reports. These assumptions are generally consistent with Watts’ (2003a) view 
that an important role of conservatism is to constrain management’s opportunistic financial 
reporting behavior.  
In addition, we impose a stylized representation of an asymmetric accounting convention: 
losses in the difficult-to-verify anticipated profit component should be reported, but gains can never 
be reported.  In the latter case, because the manager cannot report difficult-to-verify anticipated 
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gains, total profit for our illustrative firm cannot exceed $50 m.  Thus, in conjunction with this 
asymmetric accounting convention, the manager may only report credibly two profit figures: $20 m, 
which occurs 25% of the time, and $50 m, which occurs 75% of the time.3   
 We illustrate our concept of an economic role for asymmetric accounting conventions by 
contrasting two polar cases for the costs borne by the manager when biasing reports.  In the first 
case, there are no costs associated with the manager biasing reports.  Here, the manager reports $50 
m 100% of the time.  The manager cannot report difficult-to-verify gains, which implies that profit 
cannot exceed $50 m.  By the same token, if there are no costs associated with biasing reports, the 
manager circumvents the recognition of difficult-to-verify losses by deferring recognition until the 
losses manifest themselves as a reduction in cash flow (i.e., in the easy-to-verify component of 
profits).  Thus, in the end the manager reports $50 m exclusively. 
 It should be clear that when there is no cost to biasing reports and the manager reports $50 
m exclusively, the earnings report contains no information. In Figure 1, the line A-0-A’ depicts the 
relation between reported earnings and economic earnings (or equivalently, change in price or 
returns) for this cost structure. Specifically, the slope coefficient in a regression of reported earnings 
and returns is zero in bad, typical, and good years.  
 
Insert Figure 1 here 
  
 The purpose of examining this first cost structure is to emphasize that it is not the 
asymmetry of conservative accounting conventions, per se, that leads to difficult-to-verify losses 
                                                 
3 As an aside, our characterization of a conservative accounting convention is not intended to suggest that difficult-to-
verify gains never manifest themselves as income.  Difficult-to-verify gains that are unrecognized in a given period will 
ultimately show up in future income when the gains become easy to verify profit. The single period nature of our 
example, in conjunction with a characterization of a conservative accounting system as one in which difficult-to-verify 
gains go unrecognized at the end of the period, is intended to proxy for the untimely recognition of gains. 
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being reported, but rather the costs and benefits to the manager associated with his taking certain 
actions in conjunction with these conventions (see for example, Ball, Robin and Wu, 2003 for 
additional discussion on this issue). In fact, in this extreme case where the manager bears no costs 
from biasing earnings, difficult-to-verify losses are never reported in a timely manner, and the 
earnings report is no more informative than if the accounting system simply required recognition of 
easy-to-verify information.  Thus, the existence of conservative accounting conventions may only 
be rough proxies for the costs associated with biasing, manipulating, or circumventing difficult-to-
verify losses. This point highlights the importance of research designs such as Bushman and 
Piotroski’s (2006) that explore variation in conservative accounting reports as a function of the 
potential costs and benefits to firms and managers from misreporting their financial performance 
(e.g., variation in the strength of the judicial system, public enforcement, private enforcement, etc.). 
Now consider a second cost structure in which it is prohibitively costly for managers to bias 
reports.  Here the manager reports $20 m 25% of the time and $50 m 75% of the time.  As it is 
prohibitively costly to circumvent the recognition of difficult-to-verify losses, the manager reports 
them.  At the same time, the conservative accounting convention prohibits reporting difficult-to-
verify gains, and so profit cannot exceed $50 m. 
In Figure 1, the line B-0 depicts the relation between reported earnings and returns in a bad 
year in this cost structure. Because it is prohibitively costly for the manager to circumvent losses, 
the market rationally interprets the manager’s report of a profit of $20 m as a true economic profit 
of $20 m with certainty, and prices the firm's activities correspondingly: the market sets the price of 
the firm at $20 m. This, in turn, implies that if one were to associate a “bad news” report with the 
market price of the firm, the association would be 1 (in an experiment over time or across firms, this 
is equivalent to an R2 of 100%).  Thus, there is no informational inefficiency for bad news.  Because 
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earnings are reported truthfully in bad years, there is a one-to-one mapping between reported 
earnings and returns, and the slope coefficient is one. 
 In Figure 1, the line 0-B’ depicts the relation between reported earnings and returns in 
typical (i.e., $0 in difficult-to-verify items) and good years ($30 million in difficult-to-verify items). 
Because the conservative accounting system prevents difficult-to-verify gains from being 
recognized, the manager reports a profit of $50 m in both typical and good years.  The market, in 
turn, rationally interprets an earnings report of $50 m as true profit of $50 m with probability 50% ÷ 
(50% + 25%) = ⅔, and a true profit of $80 m with probability 25% ÷ (50% + 25%) = ⅓.  Thus, the 
market rationally prices the firm's activities at ⅔ x $50 m + ⅓ x $80 m = $60 m.  This, in turn, 
implies that if one were to associate a “typical news” report of $50 m (which the conservative 
accounting convention forces the manager to make irrespective of whether true profits are $50 m or 
$80 m) with the $60 m market price of the firm, the association would be 83% (in an experiment 
over time or across firms, this is equivalent to an R2 of 83%).   
Here, obviously, there is an information loss, or inefficiency, associated with a “typical 
news” report compared to a “bad news” report. As a result, there is a less than one-to-one mapping 
between reported earnings and returns, and the slope coefficient is less than one (i.e., a dollar of 
earnings translates into less than a dollar of returns). The line B-0-B’ depicts the well-known 
asymmetry, or “kink,” in the earnings-returns relation that has been widely documented across firms 
and countries.  
 These polar cases of no costs and prohibitive costs on managers who bias earnings reports 
illustrate our interpretation of the economic underpinnings of conservatism. When greater 
conservatism is interpreted as the imposition of greater costs associated with biasing reports, the 
benefit of an economic system gravitating toward a more conservative standard is clear: the 
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information content of reports increases, price efficiency increases, and the expected bias in reports 
declines.  
 We caution, however, that although our interpretation of conservatism illustrates the greater 
informational efficiency of a reporting system that recognizes difficult-to-verify losses in a timely 
manner vis-à-vis a reporting system that suppresses this information, our analysis to this point does 
not provide justification for the asymmetric recognition of gains and losses.  To see the efficiency of 
symmetric recognition of gains and losses, suppose that the asymmetric accounting conventions 
described above were abandoned. Specifically, consider an accounting system that requires the 
symmetric recognition of both difficult-to-verify losses and gains in conjunction with the 
continuation of an environment in which it is prohibitively costly for the manager to bias reports. In 
this scenario, the manager reports truthfully in all states: he reports profits of $20 m, $50 m, and $80 
m wherever appropriate.  Here, there is no informational inefficiency. In Figure 1, the straight line 
B-0-B” depicts the relation between reported earnings and returns in this symmetric cost structure. 
Because earnings are reported truthfully in bad, typical and good years, there is a one-to-one 
mapping between reported earnings and returns, and the slope coefficient is one.   
The key point here is that an asymmetric accounting convention that reports bad news in a 
timely manner, but good news in an untimely manner, creates informational inefficiencies.4 
Empirically, there is substantial evidence that asymmetric accounting conventions are pervasive 
around the world, and that they have been so for a long time, suggesting that such conventions have 
stood the test of time and serve a valuable purpose (see, for example, Basu, 1997). The key question 
is why? Two possibilities come to mind. Firstly, it may be that both difficult-to-verify gains and 
                                                 
4 Holthausen and Watts (2001) note that informational efficiency is neither a necessary nor sufficient condition for 
accounting reports to be useful or efficient for contracting purposes. We do not argue that informational efficiency is the 
primary objective of accounting reports, but rather that the merit of asymmetric informational efficiency in accounting 
reports requires articulation of a contracting or other economic explanation.  
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losses are valuable from an information perspective, but that difficult-to-verify losses are less costly 
to incorporate into earnings (e.g., due to lower data collection costs, auditing costs, or willingness of 
management to report truthfully). This explanation, however, seems unlikely.  As noted by Leuz 
(2001), it is difficult to see why gains are more costly to include in financial reports than losses, and 
if anything, it seems likely that managers would be more willing, not less willing, to report good 
news in a timely manner (see, for example, Ball and Shivakumar, 2005).  The second possibility is 
that difficult-to-verify losses and gains are both costly to incorporate into earnings, but that the costs 
and benefits of information about losses and gains is asymmetric for certain parties that contract 
with the firm over reported earnings (e.g., bondholders, board members, regulators, etc.). We turn 
now to a discussion of this potential contracting role of conservatism. 
 
3.2  Contracting efficiencies of asymmetric recognition of gains and losses 
A large literature, including Ball (2001) and Watts (2003a), supports the asymmetric 
recognition of gains and losses by arguing that certain contracts are optimally written over reported 
accounting numbers, and that the efficiency of these contracts is improved by implementing 
conservative accounting conventions. Bushman and Piotroski motivate their hypotheses using six 
explicit and implicit contracting settings that might influence the demand for accounting 
conservatism: 1) debt contracts, 2) litigation costs, 3) political costs to regulators, 4) taxes, 5) 
political economy, and 6) managerial compensation contracts.  Our interpretation of these 
arguments is that they generally rely on some combination of four assumptions: i) managers can, 
and have incentives to, bias accounting reports; ii) it is costly to incorporate difficult-to-verify 
information about anticipated cash flows into earnings due to audit costs, compliance costs, etc.; iii) 
important users of financial statements, such as debtholders, have an asymmetric demand for timely 
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information about bad news; and iv) contracts are written over reported accounting numbers and it 
is costly to write contracts that adjust reported accounting numbers. 
We begin our discussion of conservatism hypotheses by addressing what we perceive to be a 
common misconception about assumption i) above that managers have incentives to bias accounting 
reports.  Specifically, we reiterate the points made by researchers such as Basu (1997) and Ball and 
Shivakumar (2005), who note that the mere existence of bias in reported accounting numbers is 
unlikely to make asymmetric conventions more efficient in many contracting settings. Bias can be 
accommodated readily within many contracting settings by simply adjusting the parameters of the 
contract. For example, if bondholders have rational expectations about reporting bias, the 
parameters of the debt covenants can (and will) be set to obtain the desired probability of technical 
default. Similarly, if compensation committees have rational expectations about reporting bias, the 
parameters of compensation contracts can be set (e.g., by adjusting the multiplier on reported 
earnings) to obtain the desired expected compensation.  An example of the latter can be found in 
Slezak and Goldman (2005); they demonstrate how efficient compensation contracts can be written 
to accommodate managers who bias accounting reports along the lines suggested by Fisher and 
Verrecchia (2000). Therefore, to motivate the bias-reducing aspects of conservative accounting 
conventions in these settings, one must articulate why contracting over GAAP-imposed bias-
reducing accounting requirements is more efficient than firm-specific or even setting-specific 
contracts that account for expected bias or make conditional adjustments over time. We note, 
however, that in some very rigid contracting settings in which it is extremely costly to account or 
adjust for expected bias, such as the legal or political arena, reporting bias may induce a demand for 
conservative accounting. We discuss this latter possibility in more detail below.   
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One of the more straightforward contracting settings that could create a demand for 
conservative accounting is debt contracts. Debtholders are an example of an important user of 
financial statements who have an asymmetric demand for good and bad news about profitability. 
Although debtholders demand information about both gains and losses, the fixed claims of 
debtholders are generally more sensitive to bad news about profitability or the value of net assets 
than they are to good news.5  For example, holders of debt in a financially healthy firm might find 
some important bad news relevant to valuing their claims, but will find good news relatively less 
important in valuing their claims. Thus, debtholders have a relatively greater demand for bad news, 
and if firms fail to provide such information, debtholders will price protect and impose a higher cost 
of capital on the firm. And, under the assumption that difficult-to-verify information about 
anticipated profitability is costly to incorporate into financial statements, it may be more efficient 
(i.e., less costly) for firms to incorporate more of the difficult-to-verify bad news and less of the 
difficult-to-verify good news into financial statements in a timely manner (the difficult-to-verify 
good news will be recognized into financial statements when it is realized and becomes easy-to-
verify good news). 
Note that this role of conservatism in debt contracting is distinct from the argument made by 
Ball (2001), Bushman and Piotroski (2006) and others that conservatism serves a useful role in 
reducing slack in debt covenants. Borrowers and lenders will consider the existing accounting 
system and expected level of bias in reported financial reports when setting debt covenants. Further, 
as noted by Leuz (2001), it is inefficient to set covenants that trigger too often or too infrequently. 
                                                 
5 The exception to this general rule is when debtholders’ claims are substantially out of the money, in which case the 
claims are likely to be more sensitive to good news. However, debtholders with out-of-the-money claims (e.g., firms in 
bankruptcy) are likely to have greater access to financial information about the firm than is available through publicly 
filed reports.  
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As such, the parameters of the covenants are expected to be set so that slack is neither too little nor 
too great, regardless of whether the accounting system is more or less conservative.  
The existence of political, litigation, and tax costs are three other commonly posited 
arguments to motivate conservative accounting. In the political cost case, it is argued that politicians 
(and, in turn, firms) face asymmetric costs associated with incorporating bad news versus good 
news into financial reports. For example, politicians may be susceptible to greater pressures from 
their constituents when bad news is not incorporated into financial statements than when good news 
is not incorporated. Similarly, managers and shareholders may be more vulnerable to lawsuits when 
bad news is not incorporated into financial statements than when good news is not incorporated. 
Under the assumptions that reported accounting numbers cannot be adjusted easily in political and 
legal contractual settings, and difficult-to-verify anticipated profits and losses are costly to 
incorporate into financial statements, again, it may be efficient to incorporate difficult-to-verify bad 
news into financial statements and ignore difficult-to-verify good news. Further, unlike the debt 
contract example described above, it seems plausible that accounting conventions that simply offset 
managers’ tendency to bias upward reported accounting numbers could reduce political and 
litigation costs (e.g., accounting conventions that reduce net assets by an average of 10% for each 
firm). This effect occurs because parties in these contracting settings, such as political 
constituencies and court systems, may not readily make adjustments to counteract negative 
reporting bias.6  
The authors’ tax hypothesis is that tax reporting and financial reporting are linked, and so 
firms have an incentive to report conservatively to minimize the present value of their tax burden. 
                                                 
6 For example, imagine two firms, one of which is widely known to systematically underreport earnings by 10% every 
period and the other which is widely known to systematically overreport earnings by 10% every period. Although such 
underreporting results in no loss of information to sophisticated parties that contract with these firm, one can envision 
that a jury might be more likely to find the overreporting firm guilty of misleading investors. 
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On one hand, taxing authorities are expected to have rational expectations about this incentive and 
can adjust the tax rates and code to take it into consideration (e.g., the Internal Revenue Service 
routinely adjusts the tax code to crack down on various shelters).  On the other hand, one can 
envision the possibility that politicians face pressures to enact high corporate tax rates, but 
recognizing that excessive taxes can stifle investment and growth, regulators allow firms to report 
downward biased (i.e., conservative) earnings.   
Bushman and Piotroski also introduce to the conservative accounting literature an interesting 
political economy argument. They suggest governments may be of two types: 1) self-serving, which 
attempt to take over profitable businesses to extract value or, 2) benevolent, which intervene when 
firms are inefficient and performing poorly. Firms want to avoid government intervention and can 
have incentives to either manage net assets and/or earnings upward (i.e., less observed 
conservatism) or downward (i.e., more observed conservatism) depending upon the type of 
government. However, a potentially confounding issue with the political economy argument is that 
governments presumably understand both the incentives that managers have to avoid intervention 
and the nature of accounting conventions, and likely will back it out in making intervention 
decisions; that is, governments may have rational expectations). Further, governments can also 
generally exert influence over accounting policy, and can potentially require accounting 
conventions that help convince their constituents that firms are either inefficient or profitable, 
depending on the government’s objective. 
Finally, an interesting feature of all of the explanations for conservatism thus far is that 
managers have incentives to report conservatively even in the absence of conservative accounting 
rules. That is, given that both firms and their managers bear costs from paying a higher taxes or cost 
of capital, or attracting costly political attention or litigation, mandated conservative accounting 
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rules should not be necessary to achieve conservative accounting reports. In other words, when 
there is no agency conflict between firms and their managers, the managers have clear incentives to 
bias reports upward or downward depending on the direction that minimizes costs to the firm.  
Therefore, although these explanations predict variation in observed conservative accounting 
reports across political, legal, and tax regimes, they do not necessarily predict variation in the 
degree of conservative accounting rules.  
The authors’ final contracting setting argues that managerial compensation arrangements are 
expected to be more efficient when compensation contracts are written over conservative 
accounting numbers. However, this argument seems problematic and does not fit well within the 
economic framework we summarized above.  To explain this concern, we first note that because 
accrual accounting and cash accounting result in the same total earnings over time (subject to clean 
surplus and other standard assumptions) preferences over accounting systems for compensation 
contracting stem from managerial horizon issues. A large literature documents the existence of both 
underinvestment and overinvestment by managers with short horizons. For example, as Ball and 
Shivakumar (2005) note, if losses are not recognized in a timely manner in earnings, managers with 
short horizons may not discontinue poorly performing projects. There is a flip side however, as 
recognized by Leuz (2001) and Watts (2003a), which is clearly conveyed in the following excerpt 
from Watts (2003a): 
Agency cost-reducing contracts include debt contracts between the firm and holders of the 
firm's debt, management compensation contracts, employment contracts, and cost-plus sales 
contracts. Contracting parties demand timely measures of performance and net asset values 
for compensation and debt contract purposes. Ceteris paribus, managerial performance 
measures in compensation contracts, such as earnings, are more effective when they are 
timely and reflect the effects of the managers' actions on firm value in the period in which 
the actions are taken. Timeliness avoids dysfunctional outcomes associated with managers' 
limited tenure with the firm, often referred to as the manager's limited horizon. For example, 
a manager may forgo positive net present value projects with near-term negative earnings 
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because future earnings will reflect the benefits of the project after the manager has retired 
or left the firm (Watts, 2003a, pg. 211). 
 
Thus, if gains are not recognized in a timely manner, managers with short horizons may 
forgo investing in positive NPV projects.7  Therefore, if we make the assumption that it is efficient 
to write compensation contracts over accounting earnings (as opposed to contracting over stock 
returns or other performance measures), it is not clear why or how a compensation contract would 
necessarily be more efficient by excluding timely information about economic gains. Further, as 
noted above, managers’ incentives to bias reported accounting numbers upward does not provide an 
obvious motivation for conservative accounting conventions (e.g., see again, Slezak and Goldman, 
2005). Managers have incentives to bias reported accounting numbers upward regardless of whether 
or not conservative accounting conventions exist. Therefore, regardless of whether conservative 
accounting conventions exist, the firm must set the parameters of a compensation contract such that 
the manager is expected to earn his reservation utility. And, as such, conservative accounting 
reports alter the optimal weights in the compensation contract but are unlikely to improve the 
efficiency of these contracts. As a result, we are unable to endorse managerial compensation 
contracts as a candidate driving the demand for conservative accounting. 
Our views on how various contracting settings create a demand for three features of 
conservative accounting are summarized in Table 1. In the first column, we predict that only the 
political costs, litigation, tax and possibly political economy settings are reasonably expected to 
                                                 
7 As an example of a setting where timely gain and loss information might be important, consider a recent study by 
Bushman, Piotroski, and Smith (2005), who examine in a global setting the speed with which managers increase or 
decrease investment flows in response to improved or deteriorating investment opportunities, respectively. The focus of 
the authors’ analysis is whether managers decrease investment flows in response to deteriorating investment 
opportunities more quickly when accounting information about losses is more timely. However, the authors’ descriptive 
statistics indicate that the speed with which managers increase investment flows in response to improved investment 
opportunities varies as much across countries as the speed with which managers decrease investment flows in response 
to deteriorating investment opportunities. This comparison suggests that providing incentives for managers to take 
positive NPV projects may well be equally as important as providing managers with incentives to shut down negative 
NPV projects.  
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create demand for a downward bias in earnings or net assets.  We predict that increasing the 
marginal costs of manipulating difficult-to-verify information about both gains and losses is 
expected to lower contracting costs in all settings. Finally, we predict that the asymmetric 
recognition of difficult-to-verify losses and gains is potentially cost reducing only in the debt, 
litigation and political costs settings. However, note that our predictions do not consider the costs of 
implementing and enforcing accounting conventions or policies, and so we can only make 
statements about motivations for conservative accounting, not about the optimal level of 
conservatism, or truthful reporting in general. 
 
4. Interpretation of “good news sensitivity” and “incremental bad news sensitivity” 
In this section, we discuss Bushman and Piotroski’s interpretation of their “Basu-type” 
regressions of earnings on stock returns.  We illustrate potential inference problems stemming from 
an interpretation of conservatism based on the sensitivity of bad news relative to the sensitivity of 
news in general. In particular, we discuss conditions under which such an interpretation is unlikely 
to be consistent with the economic contracting theories of conservatism described above in Section 
3. Our skepticism stems from the fact that the relative sensitivity interpretation will tend to 
categorize countries with less timely recognition of news in earnings as being more conservative. 
Consistent with a large prior literature, Bushman and Piotroski define conservatism as the 
asymmetric recognition of economic gains and losses into earnings. To detect variation in 
conservatism across institutional structures, they develop a regression framework initiated by Basu 
(1997) and employed for cross-country comparisons by Ball, Kothari and Robin (2000) and Ball, 
Robin and Wu (2003). The Basu-type regression is illustrated by Bushman and Piotroski in their 
Equation (1): 
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NI = β0 + β1NEG + β2RET + β3NEG*RET + ε                                              (1) 
In this regression, “NI” is net income, “RET” is stock returns and is the proxy for news, and “NEG” 
is a dummy variable that equals one for negative returns and zero otherwise. In the most common 
interpretation of this regression, β2 tells us how news, in general, is reflected in NI, where a larger 
coefficient indicates that earnings exhibits a greater response for a given amount of news in returns.  
β3 tells us whether this mapping is incrementally different for bad news. When β3 > 0, bad news is 
reflected in NI more quickly than good news, and accounting is considered to be conservative. We 
refer to this interpretation as the “incremental sensitivity” interpretation. Note that although β2 is 
sometimes interpreted as “good news” sensitivity, this labeling is misleading because other things 
equal, when β2 is smaller, both good news and bad news are less timely.  Bushman and Piotroski 
follow Ball et al. (2000) and Ball et al. (2003) and explore cross-country differences in 
conservatism by testing whether the coefficients β2 and β3 vary with country-specific institutional 
characteristics. 
In contrast to the incremental sensitivity interpretation described above, Bushman and 
Piotroski use an alternative interpretation of conservatism that considers countries to be more 
conservative if either β3 is higher or β2 is lower. Although not described explicitly as such by the 
authors, this interpretation is similar to a measure of the relative sensitivity of bad news to news in 
general as used in Pope and Walker (1999), Givoly and Hayn (2000), and Francis, LaFond, Olsson, 
and Schipper (2004). Intuitively, Bushman and Piotroski consider greater values of the following 
ratio of bad news sensitivity to general news sensitivity as indicating greater conservatism: 
Greater (β3 + β2) / β2  ⇒  Greater conservatism     (2)  
Thus, Bushman and Piotroski consider a country to be more conservative either when bad news is 
incrementally timelier, i.e., β3 is higher, or when news in general is less timely, i.e., β2 is smaller. 
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Bushman and Piotroski do not formally compute or statistically test for differences in this ratio, but 
instead look for differences across countries in β2 and differences in β3 as separate signals about the 
degree of conservatism. 
Our main point in this subsection is to express caution regarding Bushman and Piotroski’s 
interpretation of less timely news in general as evidence of greater conservatism. As described in 
Section 3 above, conservatism is hypothesized to facilitate contracting efficiency in various settings. 
In light of this role for conservatism, a problem with the relative sensitivity interpretation is that 
when two countries have accounting systems with similar incremental timeliness of bad news (i.e., 
similar β3), the country with less timely recognition of news in general (i.e., smaller β2) will be 
considered more conservative. It seems difficult to argue that, when two countries have similar 
incremental timeliness of bad news, the country with less timely recognition of news in general has 
an accounting system that facilitates greater contracting efficiency. Stated another way, for a given 
amount of incremental timeliness of bad news, the relative sensitivity measure will tend to favor 
firms or countries with untimely recognition of news in general as being more conservative and, 
therefore, as producing accounting reports that are more efficient for contracting purposes.  
As a case in point, consider Bushman and Piotroski’s Table 5 that examines the relation 
between conservatism and the strength of securities laws, as measured by strong public and private 
enforcement. In every specification tabulated, the incremental sensitivity of earnings to bad news is 
not significantly different across countries with different public and private enforcement. Thus, the 
incremental sensitivity interpretation of Table 5 is that there is no evidence that public enforcement 
or private enforcement is associated with conservative accounting. At the same time, however, the 
authors find lower sensitivity of news in general for countries with strong public enforcement. Their 
interpretation of this result is that strong public enforcement exhibits greater “relative sensitivity” 
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and therefore greater conservatism. However, as noted above, it is difficult to see why, holding 
incremental bad news sensitivity constant, contracting efficiency is facilitated by less timely 
recognition of news in general in countries with strong public enforcement. Conversely, it is 
difficult to see why, holding incremental bad news sensitivity constant, countries with weak public 
enforcement have lower contracting efficiency simply because news in general is recognized in a 
timelier manner. To the contrary, one might reasonably argue that more timely general news 
recognition and equally timely incremental bad news recognition suggests a more, not less, useful 
accounting system for contracting. 
Although we question the consistency of the relative sensitivity interpretation of 
conservatism with the economic hypotheses discussed in Section 3, we note that the incremental 
sensitivity interpretation is not without its own problems with respect to drawing inferences about 
an accounting system that improves contracting efficiency through conservatism.8 Specifically, the 
incremental sensitivity interpretation will conclude that two countries are equally conservative if 
they have similar incremental bad news sensitivities, i.e., similar β3, but different general news 
sensitivities, i.e., different β2. As with the relative sensitivity interpretation, one can argue that 
holding incremental timeliness of bad news constant, a country with more timely news in general 
has the accounting system that facilitates more efficient contracting. The incremental sensitivity 
interpretation fails to consider this variation in general news sensitivity.   
Consistent with our discussion in Section 3 above, a key point with respect to both the 
relative and incremental sensitivity interpretations is that timelier recognition of news in general (or 
more specifically gains) does not imply an accounting system that is less efficient for contacting 
                                                 
8 Pope and Walker (1999) and Basu (1999) discuss econometric strengths and weaknesses of the incremental and 
relative sensitivity interpretations. 
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purposes. However, given that both interpretations have inference issues with respect to the role of 
timely recognition of gains, we believe that this is an important area for future research. 
 
5. Future research: Testing the links between institutions and accounting-based contracts, and 
between accounting-based contracts and conservatism 
 Our final discussion point addresses avenues for future research on direct links between 
institutions and accounting-based contracts, and between accounting-based contracts and 
conservatism.  The primary tests conducted by Bushman and Piotroski (Tables 4 through 6) are 
joint tests of the link between institutions and accounting-based contracts, and the link between 
accounting-based contracts and conservatism. Specifically, their research design examines the 
following link, 
Institutions   ⇒   Prevalence of conservatism 
as a joint test of the following two links, 
Institutions   ⇒   Use of accounting-based contracts   ⇒   Demand for conservatism 
To illustrate these links, consider the hypotheses and tests of a relation between the strength 
of the legal/judicial regime and accounting conservatism. The authors describe their predictions as 
follows: “If stronger legal/ judicial regimes lead to a more prominent role for the use of accounting 
numbers in formal contracts, firms in countries with stronger legal/ judicial regimes may respond to 
a higher ‘contracting’ demand for conservative reporting (Bushman and Piotroski, 2006, Section 
2.2).”  Thus, to motivate the first of the two links, the authors predict that strong legal / judicial 
regimes provide an enforcement mechanism that facilitates the use of accounting-based contracts. 
Similarly, the authors predict that strong securities laws will lower contracting costs, thereby 
increasing the use of accounting numbers in contracts. To motivate the second link, the authors 
predict that greater use of accounting numbers in contracts, in turn, creates a demand for verifiable 
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and conservative accounting information.  In Tables 4 and 5, the authors document evidence 
consistent with the predicted positive relation between the strength of both the legal / judicial 
regime and securities laws and accounting conservatism.  
However, it is interesting to consider whether the two intermediate relations that link the 
authors’ joint hypotheses actually hold across countries. To illustrate the importance of these 
intermediate links, consider the authors’ predictions that stronger legal / judicial regimes and 
securities laws allow a more prominent role for contracts that use accounting numbers.  As two 
proxies for the prominence of accounting-based contracts in their sample countries, the authors 
offer measures of the extent of private debt financing (as a fraction of country equity capitalization) 
and ownership concentration in the economy. The authors predict that accounting-based contracts 
are more prevalent in high private debt countries and where equity is more widely held. Examining 
Table 3 Panel B, we note that these proxies for accounting-based contracts do not always correlate 
with the strength of the legal /judicial regime or securities laws as predicted. On one hand, as 
predicted, private debt financing is more prevalent in strong judicial regimes (correlation = +0.30). 
On the other hand, contrary to predictions, private debt financing is less prevalent in countries with 
strong securities laws (correlation = -0.35).  
One possible reason for these mixed correlations is that a strong legal / judicial regime might 
facilitate both less costly private debt financing and less costly equity financing, making the relation 
between the legal / judicial regime and the ratio of debt-to-equity financing difficult to predict. 
Another possibility is that the authors’ proxies for the legal / judicial regime or the prevalence of 
accounting-based contracts are noisy. For example, widely-held equity and private debt financing 
may not be universally associated with greater accounting-based contracts. On the other hand, if 
widely-held equity and private debt financing are indeed good proxies for accounting-based 
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contracts, then these variables may well be more direct proxies for the strength of the judicial /legal 
regime and securities laws than the authors’ proxies for these institutional features. This argument 
follows from the expectation that if contracts are widely used by firms and investors in a country, 
this is prima facie evidence that an enforcement mechanism exists for these contracts.  Given that 
links such as these are critical to our understanding of how institutions influence accounting reports, 
we believe the literature would benefit from more direct investigation of how institutions influence 
the use of accounting-based contracts. 
The second link illustrated above, that greater prevalence of accounting-based contracts 
implies greater demand for conservatism, is also critical to the authors’ joint hypotheses. In Tables 4 
through 6, the authors simply assume this second link exists. However, in Table 7, the authors 
examine the interactive effect of proxies for accounting-based contracts on the relation between the 
strength of the legal / judicial regime and conservatism. For example, they ask whether countries 
with more private debt financing and less concentrated ownership exhibit a stronger relation 
between the legal / judicial regime and conservatism. However, if private debt financing and 
ownership concentration are good proxies for the use of contracts, then it becomes interesting to 
examine the main effect relation between conservatism and both private debt financing and 
ownership concentration as a more direct test of the second link described above.  These main effect 
relations, as reflected by the coefficients β11 and β16 in Table 7, are both interesting and puzzling. 
Specifically, it appears that accounting reports are actually somewhat less conservative in countries 
with greater private debt financing and less concentrated ownership (although we note the fact that 
private debt financing and ownership concentration are correlated makes it difficult to determine 
whether this is, in effect, one puzzling finding or two).  
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As one possible explanation for this puzzling finding, consider the fact that accounting 
information is used not only for contracting purposes, but also for other purposes, such as equity 
valuation. Further, although countries with less concentrated equity ownership might use accounting 
information more extensively in contracts, the prevalence of widely-held equity in these countries is 
also likely to increase demand for accounting information that is useful for valuation purposes. And, 
as described in Section 3, asymmetric accounting systems that constrain the ability of managers to 
report information about gains are not expected to be the most efficient for equity valuation.  Again, 
given the importance of understanding whether and how conservatism is influenced by the demand 
for accounting-based contracts, we believe the literature would benefit from a more complete 
investigation of the direct link between accounting conservatism and the prevalence of contracts 
that employ financial accounting numbers. 
 
6. Concluding remarks  
Bushman and Piotroski (2006) provide an interesting and informative examination of cross-
country institutional determinants of accounting conservatism. In this respect, the authors develop 
predictions and provide supportive empirical evidence on how accounting conservatism varies with 
countries’ legal/judicial system, securities laws, financial architecture, political economy, and tax 
regime.  
Preparatory to analyzing Bushman and Piotroski, in this discussion we attempt to integrate 
the extant literature on conservatism into a common and accepted economic framework.  Toward 
that goal, we argue that conservatism can be interpreted as more timely recognition of losses than 
gains resulting from asymmetric costs and benefits of reporting verifiable information by managers 
and/or firms with incentives to distort firm performance. We emphasize that accounting conventions 
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that report bad news in a timely manner but good news in an untimely manner creates informational 
inefficiencies.  Thus, for an asymmetric accounting convention to represent an efficient reporting 
system, contracting or other benefits must exist that more than compensate for these informational 
inefficiencies.  Using this framework, we discuss and critique the contracting settings that have 
been offered by Bushman and Piotroski and others to support predictions about variation in 
conservatism across countries. In discussing these contracting settings, we stress the importance of 
considering both the benefits and costs of asymmetric recognition of gains and losses. We also note 
that some commonly accepted contracting explanations (e.g., conservatism’s role in compensation 
contracts) appear to rely inappropriately on conservatism improving the informational efficiency of 
contracts.      
Insofar as Bushman and Piotroski explore variation in conservative accounting reports as a 
function of the potential costs and benefits to firms and managers from misreporting their financial 
performance, arguably their research design anticipates our perspective.  Nonetheless, in the 
implementation of their Basu-type regressions of earnings on returns, we note that Bushman and 
Piotroski rely on an interpretation of conservatism that is based on the “relative sensitivity” of bad 
news to news in general. We express concern about this interpretation by illustrating how, other 
things equal, it is expected to view countries with less timely recognition of news in general as 
being more conservative. As our final point, we suggest that the literature on conservatism would 
benefit from additional research examining the direct links between institutions and the use of 
accounting-based contracts, and between the use of accounting-based contracts and the degree of 
conservatism in observed accounting reports.   
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Fig. 1. Illustration of the relation between reported earnings and stock returns. The line A-0-A’ 
depicts the relation between reported earnings and returns when there is no cost to managers from 
biasing reports. The line B-0-B’ depicts the relation between reported earnings and returns when it 
is prohibitively costly for managers to bias reports, but where a conservative accounting system 
prevents difficult-to-verify gains from being recognized in earnings. The line B-0-B” depicts the 
relation between reported earnings and returns when it is prohibitively costly for managers to bias 
reports, but where the accounting system is symmetric and allows difficult to verify gains and losses 
to be recognized in earnings. 
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Table 1 
The relation between contracting costs and three features of conservative accounting 
 
 
  
Feature of conservative accounting 
 
Contracting 
Setting 
Would imposing a downward 
bias in earnings or net assets 
lower contracting costs? 
Would increasing the marginal cost of 
manipulating difficult-to-verify gains 
and losses lower contracting costs? 
Would excluding difficult-to-verify 
information about gains lower 
contracting costs? 
 
Debt contracts Unlikely Likely Possibly 
Political costs Possibly  Likely Possibly 
Litigation Possibly  Likely Possibly 
Taxes Possibly Likely Unlikely 
Political 
Economy Indeterminate  Likely Unlikely 
Compensation 
contracts Unlikely Likely Unlikely 
 
